

R.S.: Public

Translation of "**Policy Paper : Alternatives for state directives regarding the civilian population in Gaza**"

(P1)

**Executive summary**

1. The state of Israel is required to generate a great change in the civilian reality in the Gaza strip in light of the crimes of Hamas which have led to the "Iron swords" war, and consequently must decide what is the state objective regarding the civilian population in Gaza which it must strive for parallel to taking down Hamas rule.

2. The objective defined by the government necessitates intensive action to enlist the USA and other countries to support that objective.

3. **Axioms regarding each directive:**

a. Collapsing Hamas rule.

b. Evacuating the population from outside fighting areas is beneficial to the citizens of the strip.

c. It is necessary to plan and channel international aid that will arrive to the area in accordance to the chosen directive.

d. In any directive it is necessary to carry out a deep process of cementing ideological change (De-Nazification)

e. A chosen directive will support the state objective regarding the future of the strip and the war's endgame

4. In this document 3 alternatives will be presented for the directive of the state eschelon in Israel regarding the future of the civilian population in the Gaza strip, each directive was examined in light of the following properties:

- **Operability** – The ability to carry out operationally
- **Legitimacy** – International / Internal / Legal
- **The ability to carry out perceptual ideological change** among the population regarding Jews and Israel
- **Broad Strategic consequences**

(P2)

5. **The three alternatives we examined were:**

- Alternative A: The Gaza population remaining and importing the PNA regime<sup>1</sup>.
- Alternative B: The Gaza population remaining and growing a local arab regime.
- Alternative C: Evacuating<sup>2</sup> the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai .

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1 [R.S.: Palestinian National authority. Briefly, it is the de jure government of the occupied west bank. Used to include the Gaza strip until the 2006 elections, which Hamas won (44.45% votes, second biggest party was Fatah-41.43%). This led to a split between the two regions. It appears unified elections [were attempted](#) but not carried out. Hamas and Fatah agreed on elections with East Jerusalem's inclusion as a condition set by both. Fatah appeared to have "Asked Israel nicely" on December 10, 2019, received no concrete response, and as of April 29, 2021 became postponed]

2 [R.S.: The word "פינוי" does not imply a connection with it, while "evacuate" can imply the connection of "rescue", "for your own benefit", ect. In this document the word "evacuate" should be understood clinically, as simply to "move out of area"]

6. From an in-depth examination of the alternatives we can rely on the following conclusions:

a. **Alternative C-The alternative<sup>3</sup> which will net positive long-term strategic consequences to Israel, and is a doable alternative. Determination is required from the state eschelon in front of international pressure while placing emphasis on enlisting the USA and additional pro-Israeli countries to the procedure**

b. **Alternatives A and B suffer from significant drawbacks**, primarily regarding their strategic consequences and lack of long term feasibility. Neither will provide the deterrence effect that's required, won't enable a change of awareness, and might lead within a few years to the same problems and threats that Israel faced from 2007 to this day.

c. **Alternative A is the alternative with the most risks**, the divide in the Palestinian population in Y"Sh<sup>4</sup> and in Gaza is one of the central causes making difficult the creation of a Palestinian state. **Choosing this alternative means an unprecedented victory to the Palestinian national movement, a victory that will cost thousands of Israeli civilians and soldiers and does not guarantee security to Israel**

(P3)

### Alternative A

#### **Civilian population remains in Gaza and importing the PNA regime**

#### **Location and Regime**

1. The majority of the population remains in Gaza.
2. Israeli martial law in the first stage ; Going forward importing the PNA and posting it as the governmental entity in Gaza.

#### **Operational meanings**

1. Necessitates fighting in an area saturated with civilians. Involves risking our soldiers and requires a long time.
2. The longer the intensive fighting goes on the higher the risk of a second front opening in the north.
3. The Gazan population will resist implanting the PNA (tried before).
4. Humanitarian responsibility – imposed at the end of the war fully on Israel with all that might follow from that.

#### **International / legal legitimacy**

1. At first glance, it appears this is the least severe alternative from a humanitarian standpoint and therefore it will be easier to win widespread support. But in reality, an alternative that involves leaving the population might be the worst of them all, as many arabic casualties are to be expected in the operational stage, so long as the population remains in the cities and will be involved in the fighting.
2. The execution time will be protracted, and alongside it will lengthen the time period in which photos of civilians hurt in the war will be published
3. Military rule over the arab population will make difficult for Israel to preserve widespread international support and will lead to the creation of pressure for erecting a government of the PNA

#### **Creation of an ideological change**

3 [R.S.: "The" is not a mistranslation on our end. The original quote is "החלופה".

"חלופה" – Alternative

And placing a "ה" in front of it translates to "the". It semantically means "This specific instance". "התפוח הזה מורעל" – "This apple is poisoned". That is to say, the document says option C is *the* option that will net Israel positive and longterm consequences. Not "An alternative". *The* alternative. Its written in a way that cannot be misunderstood]

4 [R.S.: "Yehuda & Shomron", Israeli colonial name for the west bank. To clarify, *the only reason why I use this is to stick as close as I can to the original document in my translation.* Alternatively "גדה מערבית", "West bank" could have been used, but wasn't.]

1. It is mandatory to shape a public narrative of internalizing the failure and moral wrongdoing of the Hamas movement, and replacing the old perception with a moderate islamist ideology. This refers to a process similar to the de-nazification process carried out in Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan. Among others, it will be vital to dictate the study materials of schools and enforce their usage for an entire generation.
2. Getting the PNA in will make difficult on dictating study materials that will educate for legitimation of Israel. Even currently the study materials of the PNA – similarly to those of Hamas – educate for hatred and hostility to Israel.
3. Granted its possible to make the Israeli dictation of study materials a condition for importing the PNA, but it is impossible to make certain it is truly done, as the PNA itself is hostile to Israel in a significant manner.
4. Its approximated the PNA will not act firmly for shaping a public narrative of internalizing failure and moral wrongdoing of the Hamas movement, and won't act for promoting a moderate islamist ideology.
5. Even today there is in Y"S wide public support for Hamas. The PNA leadership is viewed in Y"S as corrupt and hollow, and loses to Hamas in terms of public support.

(P4)

### **Strategic consequences**

1. The PNA is a hostile organisation to Israel standing on feet of clay<sup>5</sup>. Its strengthening might cause a strategic loss to Israel.
2. The divide between the Palestinian population in Y"S and Gaza is one of the primary preventors in modern times for the creation of a Palestinian state, it is unfathomable that the result of this attack will be an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement and the paving of the road for the creation of a Palestinian state.
3. The current model in Y"S, of Israeli military rule and PNA civilian rule, is unstable and its future is clouded in fog. Its tolerated in Y"S only because of Jewish settlement being widespread in the entire area. This is because there isn't a possibility for Israeli military rule without the presence of Jewish settlements (and one shouldn't expect an enlistment of settling movements with the conditions of rebringing the PNA to Gaza anew).
4. There is no way to carry out an effective military occupation in Gaza only on the basis of military presence without settlements, and within a short time will arise the demand within Israel and internationally for a retreat – meaning a middle-stage that will not win international legitimacy in the long term – similar to the situation in Y"S today, but worse.  
The state of Israel will be considered as a colonial power with an occupation army. Emplacements and bases will be attacked and the PNA will deny any involvement.
5. **Tried and failed** – It should be reminded an outline of delivering territory to the PNA and then withdrawing military rule, was tried in the year 2006 – Hamas won the elections then forcefully took over the strip, there is no justification for the Israeli national war effort for occupying Gaza if in the end we'll repeat the same mistake that led to this present situation (total war with the Hamas).
6. **Deterrence** – this alternative will not attain the necessary deterrence regarding Hezbollah, and contrary, this alternative indicates deep Israeli weakness that will signal to Hezbollah they will not pay a real cost for a conflict with Israel, as the latter will at most carry out a similar maneuver for what was tried in Lebanon in the past – Temporary military occupation, and a retreat.
7. If the IDF will start for occupying the strip, but in the end the political result will be a PNA regime and the turning of the strip, again, into a hostile entity, the ability of Israel to enlist fighters will be grievously wounded. This move will be a historical neglect and an existential threat of the future of the state.

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5 [R.S.: Lit. "Standing on chicken legs", means flimsy and unstable]

(P5)

### Alternative B

## The population remaining in Gaza and growing a local arab rule

### Location and regime

1. Majority of the population remains in Gaza.
2. **Regime in the first stage** – Israeli military rule; **As an intermediary solution** – Continuous attempt to build local political arabic leadership, not islamist, for managing civilian aspects in the outline of the configuration of the regime in the united emirates, **a permanent solution to this option isn't seen on the horizon**<sup>6</sup>
3. Humanitarian responsibility - imposed at the end of the war fully on Israel with all that might follow from that.

### Operational execution

1. Necessitates fighting in an area saturated with civilians. Involves risking our soldiers and requires a long time.
2. The longer the intensive fighting goes on the higher the risk of a second front opening in the north.

### International / legal legitimacy

1. similarly to alternative A, this alternative necessitates fighting in an area saturated with population and will cause many casualties.
2. The execution time will be protracted, the Hamas will make use of this for psychological warfare<sup>7</sup> efforts under which photos of 'killing of civilians'<sup>8</sup> by Israel will be published.
3. Military rule over a civilian population will make harder for Israel to preserve ide international support over time.

### Creation of an ideological change

4. In the current situation, exists a lack of local opposition movements to Hamas that could be planed in its stead. I.E., even if a local leadership in the style of the emirates will arise, these are nevertheless Hamas supporters.
5. This situation will create tremendous difficulty for creating the necessary ideological change and eradicating the Hamas as a legitimate movement. For the sake of comparison, in the de-nazification process in Germany after the occupation relied on leaders who were in opposition to the Nazis.<sup>9</sup>
6. In the absence of a widespread local movement that is committed to an ideological eradication of the Hamas, it will be difficult to manufacture the necessary ideological change.

(P6)

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6 [R.S.: Meaning "not seen for the foreseeable future"]

7 [R.S.: Lit. " P"W ". I chose to write the full term to make it more readable, and because the term was more important than the form on which it was written]

8 [R.S.: Sic. The 's are present in the original document. To reiterate, every **bolding**, underlining and lists are true to the original document, and so is the '']

9 [R.S.: A good grade in history appears to not be a requirement for Israeli intelligence positions. For example, the degenerate responsible for "Aryanization" in Czechoslovakian mines in 1938-39 was a federal minister from [1949-1966](#). In 1934, Adenauer, the man who will become the FRG's first chancellor, [wrote to Goering](#):

"For years, contrary to the injunctions of the Prussian Minister of the Interior, I provided the NSDAP with the city's sports fields and allowed her to raise their swastika flag masts at their events at these. I refer to the relevant files of the city of Cologne and to the testimony of the deputy i. R. Billstein."

If our readers are interested, we can go into more detail refuting this very absurd take. The antifascists were on the GDR...]

## Strategic consequences

- In the short term, the overthrow of Hamas and occupation of the strip will be significant steps for returning Israeli deterrence and changing the reality.<sup>10</sup>
- However, it appears the deterrence effect will be insufficient and inadequate compared to the severity of the surprise attack. Additionally, the message that will be sent to Hezbollah and Iran will not be sufficiently determined. The strip will continue to be fruitful land for attempts to influence and grow terror organizations anew.
- Safe to assume such a maneuver will win support from the Gulf states due to the powerful blow dealt to the Islamic Brotherhood movement, but the amount of casualties among Gazan Arabs that it involves, shall make it more difficult.
- Long term, there will be internal Israeli and international pressure to replace the Israeli military administration with a local Arab government as soon as possible, but there is no guarantee the new leadership will oppose the legacy of Hamas<sup>11</sup>
- A local Arab government will severely struggle to perform the required narrative and ideological change, because in Gaza live members of an entire generation that was educated on Hamas's ideology,<sup>12</sup> and currently will also experience the Israeli military occupation. The likely scenario therefore is not a change in ideological views, but the creation of new Islamist movements that might be even more extreme.
- This alternative too does not grant Israel any long term strategic recompense whatsoever. The contrary is true, it might turn out as a strategic burden within a few years.

(p7)

### Alternative C

#### Evacuating the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai

##### Location and regime

1. Due to the fighting against Hamas, it is necessary to evacuate noncombatant population from the warzone.
2. Israel will act to evacuate the civilian population to Sinai
3. In the first stage tent cities will be established in the area of the Sinai ; afterwards, the creation of a humanitarian corridor to aid the civilian population of Gaza and building cities in a resettled zone in the north of Sinai
4. It is needed to create a sterile zone of a few kilometers inside Egypt and not to allow a return of the population to activity / residence close to the border with Israel in addition to creating a security perimeter in our territory close to the border with Egypt.

##### Operational

1. Calls for evacuating noncombatant population from the warzone of the Hamas attack<sup>13</sup>
2. In the first stage, actions from the air while focusing on the north of the Strip to allow ground maneuvering to the territory already evacuated and does not require fighting in an area saturated with civilian population.
3. In the second stage, ground maneuvering to occupy the territory gradually from the north along the border until the occupation of all the strip and the purification of underground bunkers from Hamas fighters.
4. The intensive ground maneuvering stage will take less time compared to alternatives A and B, hence mitigating the exposure time for opening a northern front while fighting in Gaza.

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10 [R.S.: Sic]

11 [R.S.: Lit. "resist the spirit of Hamas"]

12 [R.S.: Lit. "Raised on the knees of Hamas ideology"]

13 [R.S.: Can also be translated as "Attack on Hamas"]

5. Its important to leave the traffic route to the south usable to enable evacuation of civilian population to Rafah.<sup>14</sup>

### **International / legal legitimacy**

1. At first glance, it appears this alternative, that involves a significant evacuation of the population, might be complicated with regards to international legitimacy.

2. To our evaluation, fighting after civilian evacuation will lead to less casualties among the civilian population compared to the expected number of casualties if the civilian population remains (like what appears in alternatives a+b)

(P8)

3. Massive immigration from warzones (Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine) and civilian movements is a natural and expected consequence in light of the dangers involved in staying in the warzone.

4. Even before the war, there was a widespread desire to emigrate<sup>15</sup> to outside of Gaza among the local population and the war is expected to only intensify this phenomena.

### **5. From a legal standpoint:**

a. Its a defencive war against a terrorist organization that conducted a military invasion into Israel.

b. The demand for evacuating the noncombatant population is an accepted method that spares human lives and thus the Americans acted in Iraq in 2003.

c. Egypt has an obligation in international law to enable a population transition.

6. Israel must act to promote wide diplomatic initiative with the aim of countries that will enlist to assist the population that evacuated itself and will agree to recieve them as immigrants.

7. A list of countries that its only right to and will enlist to the initiative, see annex A to this document<sup>16</sup>

8. Long term, this alternative will win wider legitimacy as its referred to a population that will be involved in a poitical framework with citizenship.

### **Creating ideological change**

1. In this alternative too there will be a need to change the ideological views of the population, but Israel won't have the ability to control the plan since it will exist outside of its territory.

2. With regards to alternatives A and B, burning<sup>17</sup> the understanding of failure into the population will aid in creating an improved security reality for many years and deterring the population.

### **Strategic consequences:**

1. **Detterance** – This appropriate response will enable creating significant deterrance within the entire area, and will conclude with the transferring of a powerful message to Hezbollah that they won't do something similar in south Lebanon

2. Bringing down Hamas will win support from the Gulf states. Additionally, this alternative will be a decisive and significant blow.

3. This alternative will strengthen the Egyptian rule in north Sinai. There's a need to take care of limiting weapon transfers to north Sinai and not giving legitimacy to changing the demilitarization clauses in the peace agreement.

4. The entire situation must be wrapedp with widespread effort of denouncing the Islamic brotherhood in Egypt and the world in general, and making the organisation as terrible and assigned as 'ISIS' – legally, in the entire world and especially in Egypt

(P9)

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14 [R.S.: Egypt-Gaza border crossing]

15 Hyperlink in the original doc – leads to <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5445874,00.html>. Title reads "The escape from Gaza: The phenomena Hamas tries to hide from the media"

16 [R.S.: Included in this translation]

17 [R.S.: As in "burn into memory"]

## **Annex A : Countries and bodies that can contribute to solving the humanitarian crisis in Gaza**

### **USA**

Possible Contribution: Assistance in advancing the initiative in front of many countries including putting pressure on Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to contribute to the initiative either in resources or in taking in the displaced

Incentives: An interest in a pronounced Israeli victory and rehabilitating the deterrance of the entire West after it was hurt by the attack on Israel. Rehabilitating its position as a world leader and a key country for solving crises. Interest in creating a significant regional change and dealing a blow to the radical axis.

### **Egypt**

Possible Contribution: Opening passages and an immediate receiving of the Gazan population which will get out and assemble in Sinai areas; To grant area for settlements; Activating state pressure on Turkey and other states to do so out of preference compared to taking in a large number of the displaced; A security envelope for the initial organizing areas outside of the strip.

Possible incentives: Pressure from the USA and European countries to take responsibility and open the Rafah opening for an exit into Sinai; Monetary assistance to the current financial crisis in Egypt.

### **Saudi Arabia**

Possible Contribution: Reception benefits<sup>18</sup> and budget for organizing the effort to move the population to different states; In a non public manner financing campaigns that present the damage Hamas causes and hurting its image.

Incentives: Pressure from the USA plus a commitment to use the security net<sup>19</sup> of nearby battle groups diverted into the area against Iran as insurance; Interest in positioning Saudi Arabia as a helper for Muslims in crisis; Saudi interest in a pronounced Israeli victory over Hamas.

(P10)

### **European countries and in particular the mediterranean ones – Greece/Spain**

Contribution: Reception and settlement.

Incentives: Reception benefits<sup>20</sup> and financial support for the process coming from Arabic states.

### **Additional North African countries (Morocco, Lybia, Tunisia)**

Contribution: Reception and settlement, immediate aid in the organization areas outside the strip.

Incentives: Reception benefits<sup>21</sup> and financial support for the process coming from Arabic states; Arabic brotherhood; Pressure from European countries; Action through channels Israel has with some of these countries in a way that will enable them to keep these channels while their own image among the Arab world isn't damaged.

### **Canada**

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18 [R.S.: Lit. "Reception basket". Likely refers to "basket of goods" I.E. 'benefits' to the refugees to make it a more appealing and 'agreeable' option]

19 [R.S.: Lit. "Security umbrella"]

20 [R.S.: Lit. "Reception basket". Likely refers to "basket of goods" I.E. 'benefits' to the refugees to make it a more appealing and 'agreeable' option]

21 [R.S.: Lit. "Reception basket". Likely refers to "basket of goods" I.E. 'benefits' to the refugees to make it a more appealing and 'agreeable' option]

Contribution: Population reception and its settlement in accordance to the permissive immigration policy.

### **Large publishing offices**

Possible Contribution: Campaigns that promote the plan in the arabic world and the effort to solve the crisis in a way that doesn't slander and incite against Israel; Dedicated campaigns to the world that isn't pro-israeli in which the focus is on the message of assistance to the Palestinian brothers and their recovery even in the cost of a tone that's "scolding" or even offensive, at Israel, meant for the population who won't be able to receive another message.

Dedicated campaigns for the **residents of Gaza themselves** that will move them to agree to the plan – the messages must revolve around the loss of land, I.E. clarify there isn't any hope anymore of a return to the territories Israel will occupy in the near future, be it true or not. The picture must be "Allah made sure you lost this land because of Hamas's leadership – there is no choice but to move somewhere else with the help of your Muslim brothers".